We consider a class of games that are generalizations of the minority game, in that the demand and supply of the resource are specified independently. This allows us to study systems in which agents compete for a resource under different demand loads. Among other features, we find, using numerical simulations the existence of a robust phase change with a coexistence region as the demand load is varied, separating regions with nearly balanced supply and demand from regions of scarce or abundant resources. The coexistence region exists when the amount of information used by the agents to make their choices is greater than a critical value which is related to the point at which there is a phase transition in the standard minority game.
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Competition for resources is ubiquitous in social and biological systems. Animals foraging for food, companies competing for market share, clients competing for bandwidth on the Internet and politicians competing for votes are just a few examples. 1 In at least some such systems, agents making choices that differ from most of their competitors can lead to increased benefit for the agent. One important attempt to abstract and model the dynamics of being different is the minority game, 2 which has a remarkable phase structure as a function of the amount of information that agents use to make their choices.
While it clearly captures some important dynamics in competition for limited resources, the minority game, as it is usually specified, is limited to a specific ratio of supply and demand for the resource. By construction, at most (N-1)/2 of the N agents playing the minority game can be rewarded in a given time step of the game. In many real systems, the supply/demand may be quite different than in the minority game, and so it is of considerable interest to study games in which this ratio can have different values from that of the standard minority game. In this paper we present a class of such models, of which the minority game is a special case, and study, using primarily numerical simulations, the way in which system behavior differs for different loads (demand vs. supply). In particular, we show that there is a phase change as the relative demand on the resource changes, and that the phase diagram includes a coexistence region in which the collection of games with the same control parameters bifurcates into two distinct groups with very different behaviors.
Consider, a game in which N agents compete for a resource from one of two suppliers.
We will consider the games with more than two suppliers elsewhere. 3 The work in reference 3 also contains details and more extensive descriptions and explanations of a number of other features of our models. At each time step of the game, each supplier has available C/2 units of the resource, and each agent chooses one of the two suppliers as a source for one unit of the resource. In the games we consider here, (with two suppliers) C is even so that C/2 is an integer. The agents will make their choices of which supplier to choose at a given time step, using a mechanism similar to that used in the minority 3 game. In particular, each agent is endowed with s (in the games considered here, s=2) strategies. Each strategy is a look up table in which data from a set of publicly available information is used as input to determine an agent's decision. Each of the Ns lookup tables are randomly generated. The set of publicly available information is the historical time series of which of the suppliers had more requests for resource than that supply could satisfy, as a function of time. The games begin with a random history of length m.
Let n j (t) be the number of agents requesting resource from supplier j at time t. Supplier j is underloaded at time t if n j (t)≤C/2, and is overloaded otherwise. We indicate underloading of a supplier by +, and overloading by -. Then, the state of the system at any given time is defined by a two-tuple (a,b), where a indicates the state (over-or under- An agent must choose which of its two strategies to play at a given time. Following the scheme of the standard minority game, an agent will choose to play that strategy which would, up to that point in the game, have been responsible for the greatest gain for the agent, had that strategy been played for all past times of the game. Thus, the relative ranking of an agent's strategies will depend on the payoff to the agents. In this letter, we will consider games with two different payoff schemes. The first, called binary satisfaction, awards one point to each agent using an underloaded supplier, while agents using an overloaded supplier get nothing. These same awards are made to strategies to determine their relative rankings. The second payoff scheme, called partial satisfaction, awards one point to each agent using an underloaded supplier, while each agent using an overloaded supplier is awarded a fraction of a point equal to C/(2n), where n (>C/2) is the total number of agents using that supplier at that time step. The same scheme is used to 4 award agents' strategies. Specifically, the strategy of an agent that is actually played is awarded the same points as the agent. To evaluate a strategy not played, one awards one point to that strategy if it would have chosen an underloaded supplier at some time step, and, awards C/(2n) points if it would have chosen an overloaded supplier, where n is the number of agents actually using the overloaded supplier at that time step. Note that these awards are made assuming the same distribution of agents among the suppliers as actually occurred. No correction is made for the fact that had the unplayed strategy been played, the distribution of agents might have differed by one. Thus, this strategy ranking scheme is similar to that of the naïve agents used in the first studies of the minority game.
Most of the results reported in this paper are for games played with binary satisfaction.
However, the most important aspect of our results are robust when the payoff scheme is that of partial satisfaction, as we shall explain below.
Let σ be the standard deviation of n 1 (t) averaged over time for one game. In the standard minority game, σ 2 is monotonically related to the average size of the minority group: the larger the typical minority group, the smaller will be σ This figure has many very interesting features. . 4 In this letter we want to focus primarily on the most general overall structure, and, in particular, on the obvious difference between the region near the diagonal, in which σ 2 /N has a local maximum, and the regions further from the diagonal.
To understand qualitatively what is going on, it is useful to look at a typical sample of the time series of, say, n 1 (t) for a game in the region of the central peak, and for a game from -,-) . This is significant, since in both cases, all three states (-,-), (-,+) and (+,-) are in principle accessible to the system. In the special case of the minority game, with N=C+1, the system must be in either (-,+) or (+,-) at each time step, by construction. However, it is clear from Fig. 2a , that games played with other configurations of N and C not too far from the minority game configuration are dynamically driven to behavior which appears to be similar to that of the minority game. On the other hand, if N is too large for a given C, the system is in a much different phase, one dominated by (-,-) states in which agents typically are not rewarded. We call the region in which the system is dominated by (-,+) or (+,-) states, the region of limited resources, while the region in which the system is dominated by the state (-,-) is the region of scarce resources. The region away from the central peak, but with N<C, is dominated by the state (+,+), and we refer to that as the region of abundant resources.
That games with N>>C (N<<C) should be dominated by (-,-) ((+,+)) states is not surprising. It is also not unreasonable to suppose that configurations near the minority but with different assignments of initial strategies dynamically bifurcates into two distinct groups. The first group exhibits dynamics similar to that seen in the standard minority game, while the second group exhibits dynamics that are quite different. The behavior of the system in the scarce (or abundant) resource phase also has some interesting features. 4 The bifurcated coexistence behavior as shown in Fig. 3 Parenthetically, we comment, 6 that if the strategy space is sampled non-uniformly, there are considerable complications that arise both in the standard minority game and in the more general resource allocation games that we discuss here. In such a case, it is tempting to consider the behavior of these games as a function of dynamically generated variables, rather than as a function of external control variables, such as N, C and m.
Among the dynamically generated variables that most strongly suggest themselves is ζ≡ e S /N, where S is the entropy associated with the string of m-tuples that constitute the publicly available information. In the limit that all allowed m-tuples appear with equal probability, this quantity reduces to δ. Using ζ as a variable rather than δ is illuminating, but carries with it it's own complications, particularly vis-à-vis the problem of scaling in these games. states (-,-) ). Intermediate values do not exist. 4 These results are summarized in Fig. 5 , in which we present a qualitative phase diagram for this system. The vertical axis represents "load" on the system. In the case of It is also important to point out that the bifurcated coexistence region is robust to some significant changes in the game. In particular there continues to be a bifurcated coexistence region when games are played with partial satisfaction rather than binary satisfaction. This is very important, since it suggests that, like the phase transition in the minority game, the coexistence region may be a universal feature, mediating a transition between two phases in a large class of games.
In this paper we have examined an important class of resource allocation games that are generalizations of the minority game. As the demand load on the system varies away from the minority game configuration (N=C+1) the system continues to exhibit minoritygame like behavior until the demand is sufficiently high (or low). At that point the system exhibits a transition from a region of competition for limited resources (minority game-like behavior) to one of competition for scarce (or abundant) resources. If δ≥δ c the transition between these qualitatively different states is mediated through a surprising bifurcated coexistence region. We have also studied resource allocation systems with more than two suppliers. The general phase structure we have found here applies in those cases also, but is somewhat more complicated. 3 Based on our work, several important questions suggest themselves. First, it is clear that in the coexistence region the initial distribution of strategies to the agents strongly affects which branch a given game will occupy. However, the initial distribution of strategies to the agents is not always determinative of which branch a given game will occupy in the coexistence region.. 4 Second, it is unclear what the fate of the bifurcation phenomenon is upon the introduction of evolution for the strategies. Third, our analysis has made no direct allusion to agent wealth. There is an interesting interpretation of agent wealth in the coexistence region, and that also will be discussed elsewhere. 1 Throughout this paper, we use "compete" and "competition" informally. Our agents do not explicitly seek to frustrate one another's goals, but simply behave based on their own self-interest. In some contexts, this may be an important distinction. For a more detailed discussion, see H.V.D. Parunak, S. Brueckner, M.
Fleischer, and J. Odell, in preparation. Values of n 1 (t) that place the system in the states (+,-), (-,-) or (-,+) are indicated by the dashed lines. a.) N=203, C=200, m=6, the limited resource region, b.) N=209, C=200, m=6, the scarce resource region. 
